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Abstract
In spatial evolutionary games the fitness of each individual is traditionally determined by the payoffs it obtains upon
playing the game with its neighbors. Since defection yields the highest individual benefits, the outlook for cooperators
is gloomy. While network reciprocity promotes collaborative efforts, chances of averting the impending social decline
are slim if the temptation to defect is strong. It is therefore of interest to identify viable mechanisms that provide
additional support for the evolution of cooperation. Inspired by the fact that the environment may be just as important
as inheritance for individual development, we introduce a simple switch that allows a player to either keep its original
payoff or use the average payoff of all its neighbors. Depending on which payoff is higher, the influence of either
option can be tuned by means of a single parameter. We show that, in general, taking into account the environment
promotes cooperation. Yet coveting the fitness of one’s neighbors too strongly is not optimal. In fact, cooperation
thrives best only if the influence of payoffs obtained in the traditional way is equal to that of the average payoff of the
neighborhood. We present results for the prisoner’s dilemma and the snowdrift game, for different levels of uncertainty
governing the strategy adoption process, and for different neighborhood sizes. Our approach outlines a viable route to
increased levels of cooperative behavior in structured populations, but one that requires a thoughtful implementation.
Keywords: cooperation, social dilemmas, spatial structure, inheritance, environment
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1. Introduction
Understanding the evolution of cooperation among
unrelated individuals represents one of the major
challenges of evolutionary biology and of behavioral
sciences (Nowak, 2006). According to the principles
of Darwinian selection, any behavior that brings
benefits to others but not directly to oneself will
soon disappear (Darwin, 1958). However, this is
not fully consistent with observations that attest to
the existence of cooperative behavior, with examples
ranging from the communities of microorganisms to
animal and human societies (Milinski, 1987; Binmore,
1994; Colman, 1995; Doebeli and Hauert, 2005). In
order to explain the emergence and maintenance of
cooperation, evolutionary games, with the focus on
social dilemmas, have provided several fundamental
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insights (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998; Ohtsuki et al.,
2006; Ren et al., 2006; Ohtsuki and Nowak, 2006).
And especially the prisoner’s dilemma games and its
extensions have been considered and studied frequently
(Mesterton-Gibbons, 1991; Nowak and May, 1992;
Mesterton-Gibbons, 1992; Milinski and Wedekind,
1998; Moyano and Sa´nchez, 2009; Souza et al., 2009;
Chen et al., 2009; Traulsen et al., 2010; Jime´nez et al.,
2008; Poncela et al., 2007; Sysi-Aho et al., 2005;
Hauert and Doebeli, 2004; Santos and Pacheco, 2005)
in order to shed light on how cooperation can evolve
and how it can be maintained. In its general form the
prisoner’s dilemma game states that the players must
choose either cooperation or defection without knowing
the decision of their co-players. A cooperator receives
the reward R when meeting another cooperator, but
only the sucker’s payoff S when facing a defector.
On the contrary, a defector exploiting the cooperator
gets the temptation T , but only the punishment P if
encountering another defector. Because the above
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payoffs strictly satisfy the ranking T > R > P > S
and 2R > (T + S ), eventually the defectors will prevail
irrespective of what their opponent choose, and thus
will become the dominant strategy. Altogether, we are
faced with a social dilemma that if left “untreated” will
lead to the tragedy of the commons (Hardin, 1968).
Over the past decades, several mechanisms have
been identified that can offset an unfavorable out-
come of social dilemmas and lead to the evolution of
cooperation (Nowak, 2006). Examples include kin
selection (Hamilton, 1964), direct and indirect reci-
procity (Ohtsuki, 2004; Nowak and Sigmund, 1998a,b;
Panchanathan and Boyd, 2004; Ohtsuki and Iwasa,
2004, 2006), effective strategies such as the tit-for-tat
(Imhof et al., 2007; Baek and Kim, 2008) or win-stay-
lose-shift (Nowak and Sigmund, 1993; Chen et al.,
2008), voluntary participation (Szabo´ and Hauert,
2002), and of course spatially structured popula-
tions (Nowak and May, 1992; Nowak et al., 1994;
Nakamaru et al., 1997, 1998). Mostly notably, if
players are arranged on a lattice and interact only
with their nearest neighbors, then cooperators can
survive by means of forming compact clusters which
minimizes the exploitation by defectors and protects
those cooperators that are located in the interior
of such clusters (Nowak and May, 1992). Along
this line of research studies on the evolution of
cooperation have received a substantial boost. For
example, complex networks with the connectivity
structure similar to that of social networks have
been recognized as very beneficial for the evolution
of cooperation (Abramson and Kuperman, 2001;
Santos and Pacheco, 2005, 2006; Santos et al., 2006;
Tang et al., 2006; Ohtsuki et al., 2006; Florı´a et al.,
2009; Go´mez-Garden˜es et al., 2008; Rong et al., 2007;
Poncela et al., 2007; Kuperman and Risau-Gusman,
2008; Go´mez-Garden˜es et al., 2007; Du et al., 2009).
In particular, the heterogeneity, or diversity, al-
lows for cooperative behavior to prevail even if the
temptations to defect are large (Szolnoki and Szabo´,
2007; Perc and Szolnoki, 2008; Santos et al., 2008;
Perc and Wang, 2010). The mobility of players can
also lead to an outbreak of cooperation, even when the
conditions are noisy and do not necessarily favor the
spreading of cooperators (Helbing and Yu, 2008, 2009;
Jiang et al., 2010). Uncertainty, if appropriately tuned,
may also have a positive impact on the evolution of co-
operation (Perc, 2006; Vukov et al., 2006). Moreover,
there exist comprehensive reviews that capture suc-
cinctly recent advances on this topic (Szabo´ and Fa´th,
2007; Perc and Szolnoki, 2010; Roca et al., 2009).
However, while some of the works focus predom-
inantly on the effects of individual properties, oth-
ers build on the influence of external factors. No-
tably though, the conceptual relatedness of these seem-
ingly very disparate mechanisms is often neglected.
Here our aim is to propose an approach that integrates
seamlessly between individual and external factors by
means of a single parameter. The definition of fit-
ness has already been modified for this purpose, for
example based on the extension of Hamilton’s rule
(L. Lehmann and L. Keller, 2006; Doebeli and Hauert,
2006), and here we also focus on this particular aspect
of evolutionary games. As suggested in many previ-
ous works concerning also complex networks and pro-
cesses taking place on them (Albert and Baraba´si, 2002;
Bianconi and Baraba´si, 2001), taking into account the
fact that different nodes (players) have a different ability
to compete successfully for a dominant position within
the network is achieved best by assigning a fitness to
each individual. Naturally, here we also consider in-
dividual fitness as being representative for the ability
or potential of each individual to survive and repro-
duce. Moreover, we build on the fact that individual
success in general depends on the inheritance as well
as on environmental factors, and indeed many paradig-
matic examples can been found in the biological and so-
cial sciences supporting this assertion (Krakauer, 2005;
Cant and English, 2006; Keller, 1997; Schelling, 1978;
Rodrigues et al., 2009). For example, a young lion not
only inherently knows how to suckle on its mother, but
it has to gradually learn also how to prey and protect its
territory according to the numbers of competing oppo-
nents. If it fails at either of these tasks, its chances of
survival are slim. By considering the traditional pay-
off accumulation (what the players obtain upon play-
ing with their neighbors) as something related to inher-
itance, and by considering the average payoff of all the
neighbors as being representative for the environment,
we propose a simple single-parameter dependent payoff
function that allows us to determine just how much it
pays to prefer one or the other, i.e., inheritance or the
environment. In addition, the proposed payoff function
incorporates a coevolutionary ingredient in that the in-
fluence of the two factors depends dynamically on its
expected performance.
We focus on the prisoner’s dilemma game, but
present also detailed results for the snowdrift game. As
the interaction network, we consider the square lattice
with different numbers of neighbors in order to rele-
vantly assess the importance of neighborhood size. We
also examine the effects of different levels of uncertainty
by strategy adoptions on the evolution of cooperation.
Depending on the value of the parameter that deter-
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mines how strongly individuals covet their neighbors (in
the sense of wanting to rely completely on the average
payoff of their neighborhood rather than on the tradi-
tionally obtained payoffs), we demonstrate that cooper-
ation can be promoted substantially if compared to the
traditional version of the game (Szabo´ and To˝ke, 1998;
Szabo´ et al., 2005). Importantly though, we find that
the facilitation of cooperation is optimal only if the in-
heritance and the environment are represented equally
strong in the final fitness of each player. Since our find-
ings are robust to variations of the governing evolution-
ary game, the neighborhood size, as well as to variations
of the level of uncertainty governing the strategy adop-
tions, we conclude that the proposed approach outlines
a viable route to resolving social dilemmas.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 features
the methods and the description of evolutionary games,
while section 3 contains the results. In the last section
we summarize our conclusions.
2. Methods
For simplicity, but without loss of generality, we con-
sider variants of the prisoner’s dilemma and the snow-
drift game of which the outcomes depend on a single pa-
rameter only. For the prisoner’s dilemma game, the pay-
offs are T = b, R = 1 and P = S = 0, where 1 ≤ b ≤ 2
quantifies the temptation to defect and represent the ad-
vantage of defectors over cooperators. Although being
in effect the so-called weak prisoner’s dilemma in that
P = S rather than P > S , this version captures all the
relevant aspects of the game (Nowak and May, 1992).
In order to test the validity of our conclusions, we also
employ the snowdrift game with the payoffs T = 1 + r,
R = 1, S = 1 − r and P = 0, thus satisfying the ranking
T > R > S > P, where 0 ≤ r ≤ 1 represents the so-
called cost-to-benefit ratio. Indeed, the snowdrift game
is frequently studied as an alternative to the perhaps
better known prisoner’s dilemma (Hauert and Doebeli,
2004; Du et al., 2009; Wang et al., 2006).
As the interaction network, we use L × L square lat-
tices with periodic boundary conditions. Each vertex i
is initially designated as a cooperator (si = C) or defec-
tor (si = D) with equal probability. The game is iterated
forward in accordance with the Monte Carlo simulation
procedure comprising the following elementary steps.
First, player i acquires its payoff Pi by playing the game
with all its neighbors. Next, the environment of player i
is assessed by the average payoff of all its neighbors P,
that is,
P =
∑k
j=1P j
k , (1)
where k denotes the neighborhood size of player i, P j
represents the payoff of player j who is one of the neigh-
bors of player i, and the sum runs over all the neighbors
of player i.
Before proceeding with the details of how individ-
ual fitness is determined, we would like to motivate
our approach better, in particular describing why in-
heritance and environment are represented by individ-
ual (traditional) payoffs and the average payoff of all
the neighbors, respectively. From the biological point
of view, inheritance refers to the fact that individu-
als pass down their genetic material to their offspring.
In the context of evolutionary games, this corresponds
to players passing their strategy to the next gener-
ation based on their payoffs (Szabo´ and To˝ke, 1998;
Ohtsuki and Nowak, 2006). Naturally, each accumu-
lated payoff at present is the best reflection of the strat-
egy which was inherited from the previous generation.
On the other hand, in social systems the performance of
each individual is affected not just by inheritance, but
also by environmental factors (Rodrigues et al., 2009;
Ghalambor et al., 2007; Strassmann, 1989), implying
that to some extent individual success is related to the
performance of its neighbors or rather the neighborhood
as a whole. In order to capture this influence succinctly,
we consider the average payoff of all the neighbors as
the simplest measure to assess the influence of the en-
vironment. Motivated by the fact that the environment
(here represented by P) may be just as important as in-
heritance (here represented by Pi), but also by the fact
that in general the impact of these two factors may vary,
we finally evaluate the fitness of player i according to
fi =



(0.5 − u) × P + (0.5 + u) × Pi if (Pi > P),
(0.5 + u) × P + (0.5 − u) × Pi if (Pi < P),
0.5 × P + 0.5 × Pi if (Pi = P),
(2)
where the selection parameter 0 ≤ u ≤ 0.5 is used
for fine-tuning. Evidently, for u = 0 both influences
determine the final fitness of player i in equal capac-
ity. For u > 0, however, the better performing influ-
ence will be preferred, i.e., represented stronger in the
final fitness. In the limit case of u = 0.5 the fitness
fi is absolutely determined either by the environment
or by inheritance, whichever is performing better at the
time. Alternatively, Eq. (2) can also be interpreted as
follows: Before each generation (during the simulation,
each full Monte Carlo step is regarded as a new gener-
ation), we assume that the influence of inheritance and
environment on individual development is the same be-
cause we cannot objectively predict the magnitude of
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their influence before the appearance of a new genera-
tion. However, after the impact of both is evaluated, the
influence will change accordingly. If the performance
of neighbors is better, the player may benefit from the
environment. Otherwise, the influence of its neighbors
may be reduced or is kept constant. Following the deter-
mination of fitness, player i adopts the strategy s j from
its randomly selected neighbor j (whose fitness f j is de-
termined in the same way as fi) via the probability
W(s j → si) = 11 + exp[( fi − f j)/K] , (3)
where K denotes the amplitude of noise or its
inverse (1/K) the so-called intensity of selection
(Szabo´ and To˝ke, 1998). Positive values of K imply that
better performing players are readily imitated, but it is
not impossible to adopt the strategy of a player perform-
ing worse. Such errors in judgment can be attributed to
mistakes and external influences that affect the evalua-
tion of the opponent. During a full Monte Carlo step
(MCS) all players will have a chance to pass their strat-
egy once on average.
Results of Monte Carlo simulations presented be-
low were obtained on populations comprising up to
400 × 400 individuals, whereby the fraction of coop-
erators Fc was determined within 105 full MCS after
sufficiently long transients were discarded. Moreover,
final results were averaged over up to 40 independent
runs for each set of parameter values in order to assure
suitable accuracy.
3. Results
As is known, in the prisoner’s dilemma game the co-
operators will be decimated fast even if the temptations
to defect are moderate. It is thus challenging to iden-
tify non-trivial mechanisms that may sustain coopera-
tion under such conditions. In order to address this puz-
zle, we consider first the effect of the redefined fitness,
as given by Eq. (2). Figure 1 shows the characteris-
tic spatial distributions of cooperators and defectors for
different values of the parameter u. If u = 0.5 (top
left panel), where each player’s performance is abso-
lutely determined by either the inheritance or the envi-
ronment (depending on performance), cooperators will
go extinct, the final outcome thus being complete dom-
inance of defectors. However, upon a slight decrease of
u, the survival of cooperators becomes viable in that a
small fraction of cooperators can prevail by means of
forming small clusters or patches on the spatial grid. By
continuing to decrease u, the clusters of cooperators be-
come larger and more common, which ultimately results
Figure 1: Characteristic distributions of cooperators (blue) and defec-
tors (yellow) for different values of the parameter u. From top left to
bottom right u = 0.5, 0.4, 0.3, 0.2, 0.1 and 0, respectively. All panels
depict results obtained for b = 1.45 and K = 0.1 on a 100×100 square
lattice.
in averting the impeding social decline. More interest-
ingly, for u = 0 (bottom right panel), when the influ-
ence of inheritance is equal to that of the environment,
cooperators thrive best, and may even outperform de-
fectors. Hence, these results suggest that the parameter
u, determining the composition of the fitness of each
player can substantially promote cooperation, enabling
its maintenance where otherwise defection would reign
completely. Yet coveting the fitness of one’s neighbor
too strongly (which is implied by u = 0.5), even if at
the moment the neighbors are performing much better,
is not optimal for the evolution of cooperation.
In order to provide a quantitative assessment of the
impact of different values of u, we show in Fig. 2 how
the fraction of cooperators Fc and the critical tempta-
tion to defect bc, at which cooperators go extinct, de-
pends on this newly introduced parameter. Results pre-
sented in the top panel of Fig. 2 depict Fc in depen-
dence on the parameter b for different values of u. One
can find, compared with the traditional version of the
game, that the introduction of u can substantially pro-
mote the emergence and maintenance of cooperation.
Moreover, the presented results demonstrate explicitly
that the switch of the parameter u from 0.5 to 0 makes
cooperators stronger and more resilient to the invasion
of defectors. These quantitative results clearly attest to
the fact that the environment plays a vital role in in-
dividual development, specifically by the evolution of
cooperation, yet redundantly leaning on it (or the tra-
ditional accumulation of payoffs), which is implied by
u = 0.5, will not be optimal.
It’s also interesting to consider how the critical
4
1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
  u=0.5
  u=0.4
  u=0.3
  u=0.2
  u=0.1
  u=0
  traditional
 

 
F c

b
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8   k=4
  k=8
  k=12
  k=20
  k=24
b c

 

 
u
Figure 2: Top panel: Frequency of cooperators Fc in dependence on
the parameter b for different values of the selection parameter u. From
left to right u = 0.5, 0.4, 0.3, 0.2, 0.1 and 0, respectively (the outcome
of the traditional version of the game is denoted dashed). Bottom
panel: Critical threshold values b = bc, marking the transition to the
pure D phase (extinction of cooperators), in dependence on the selec-
tion parameter u for different neighborhood sizes. If compared to the
traditional version of the game (both panels), it can be observed that
cooperation can be maintained by significantly higher values of b, and
moreover, that larger neighborhood sizes may lessen the promotive
impact significantly. Depicted results in both panels were obtained
for K = 0.1.
threshold value bc, marking the extinction of coopera-
tors, varies in dependence on the selection parameter
u for different neighborhood sizes. From the bottom
panel of Fig. 2, it can be observed that the value of
bc decreases monotonously from 1.82 to 1.42 while in-
creasing u from 0 to 0.5 in case of the traditional square
lattice (k = 4). However, if the neighborhood size
on the square lattice is enlarged, this effect becomes
less and less pronounced as k increases, and in fact at
k = 24 only a marginal difference in bc can be observed
if comparing the u = 0 and the u = 0.5 case. This
result is in fact expected since increasing the neighbor-
hood size will gradually lead to well-mixed conditions
(Szabo´ and Szolnoki, 2009), but it also implies directly
that the observed phenomenon is inherently routed in
the spatiality of the interaction structure. Below we will
Figure 3: Time courses depicting the evolution of cooperation for dif-
ferent values of u. All time courses were obtained as averages over
20 independent realizations for b = 1.45 and K = 0.1 on a 200 × 200
square lattice. Note that the horizontal axis is logarithmic and that
values of Fc were recorded also in between full Monte Carlo steps to
ensure a proper resolution.
provide further evidence supporting such a conclusion
when we investigate how different values of K affect the
evolution of cooperation by different values of u. Nev-
ertheless, it is also worth pointing out that the general
features of our results remain intact upon changing the
neighborhood size, which vouches for their robustness.
In order to explain how and why different values of
u promote cooperation, we first examine time courses
of Fc for different values of the selection parameter u.
From Fig. 3, it becomes obvious fast that in the early
stages of the evolutionary process (note that values of Fc
were recorded also in between full Monte Carlo steps)
the performance of defectors is better than that of coop-
erators. This is in fact what one would expect, since de-
fectors, as individuals, should be more successful than
cooperators, which in turn should manifest in the deci-
mation of the later. What is not necessarily expected, is
that the tide shifts in favor of cooperators rather strongly
following their initial decline, and in fact the more so
the smaller the value of u. In particular, when the value
of u is large, i.e., close or equal to 0.5, cooperators will
ultimately go extinct or pend at the brink of extinction.
With the decrease of u, however, the tide may change
strongly in favor of the cooperators. For u = 0, for ex-
ample, it can be observed that the initial downfall of co-
operators is rather shallow, and ultimately, they can re-
store their presence on the spatial grid in equal capacity
as the defectors. This suggests that in the initial stages
of the game, when the cooperators are not yet clustered,
the defectors can successfully exploit them. However,
as the cooperative clusters form, they become imper-
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Figure 4: Full b − K phase diagrams for u = 0.5 (top panel) and
u = 0 (bottom panel), obtained via Monte Carlo simulations of the
prisoner’s dilemma game on the square lattice. The green and red
lines mark the border between stationary pure C and D phases and
the mixed C+D phase, respectively. In contrast with previous works
considering the square lattice (Vukov et al., 2006; Szabo´ et al., 2005),
it can be observed that for u = 0.5 (top panel) there exists an inter-
mediate uncertainty in the strategy adoption process (an intermediate
value of K) for which the survivability of cooperators is worst, i.e.,
Fc is minimal rather than maximal. This suggests that the interac-
tion topology is indirectly affected and may give rise to overlapping
triangles if either the inheritance or the environment are favored too
strongly depending on their relative performance at each particular
moment in time. Conversely, while the borderline separating the pure
C and the mixed C+D phase for the u = 0 case (bottom panel) ex-
hibits a qualitatively identical outlay as for the u = 0.5 case, the D
↔ C+D transition is qualitatively different. Note that in the bottom
panel there indeed exists an intermediate value of K for which Fc is
maximal rather than minimal, which is in agreement with what can be
expected for interaction topologies that lack overlapping triangles.
vious to the defector attacks, which is due not only to
spatial reciprocity, but also due to the newly identified
mechanism which can amplify the effect of spatial reci-
procity substantially. Ultimately, the cooperators can
therefore survive at higher temptations to defect than
would be possible by spatial reciprocity alone.
It is next of interest to examine the evolution of coop-
eration for different values of u in dependence on the un-
certainty by strategy adoptions. The latter can be tuned
via K in Eq. (3), which acts as a temperature param-
eter in the employed Fermi strategy adoption function
(Szabo´ and To˝ke, 1998). Accordingly, when K → ∞
all information is lost and the strategies are adopted by
means of a coin toss. Figure 4 features full b − K phase
diagrams for the square lattice at u = 0.5 (top) and u = 0
(bottom). Interestingly, u = 0.5 eradicates (as do in-
teraction networks incorporating overlapping triangles
(Szabo´ et al., 2005; Szolnoki et al., 2009)) the existence
of an optimal K, as can be observed from the phase
diagram presented in the top panel, which exhibits an
inverted bell-shaped D ↔ C + D transition line, in-
dicating the existence of the worst (K ≈ 0.4) rather
than an optimal temperature for the evolution of coop-
eration. This in turn implies that introducing a strong
preference towards either the inheritance (the fitness as
determined by the traditional accumulation of payoffs)
or the environment (the fitness as determined by the av-
erage payoff of all the neighbors) effectively alters the
interaction network. While the square lattice obviously
lacks overlapping triangles and thus enables the obser-
vation of an optimal K, trimming the importance via u
seems to effectively enhance linkage among essentially
disconnected triplets and thus precludes the same obser-
vation. A similar phenomenon was observed recently
in public goods games, where the joint membership in
large groups was also found to alter the effective interac-
tion network and thus the impact of uncertainly on the
evolution of cooperation (Szolnoki et al., 2009). Con-
versely, the phase diagram presented in the bottom panel
of Fig. 4 is well-known (at least qualitatively), implying
the existence of an optimal level of uncertainty for the
evolution of cooperation, as was previously reported in
(Perc, 2006; Vukov et al., 2006). In particular, note that
the D ↔ C + D transition line is bell shaped, indicat-
ing that K ≈ 0.15 is the optimal temperature at which
cooperators are able to survive at the highest value of b.
This phenomenon can be interpreted as an evolutionary
resonance (Perc, 2006), albeit it can only be observed
on interaction topologies lacking overlapping triangles
(Szabo´ et al., 2005; Szolnoki et al., 2009). Altogether,
these results confirm that the observed promotion of co-
operation is routed strongly in the spatiality of the inter-
action network, which is clearly manifested by an ex-
tensive gap between the C ↔ C+D and the D ↔ C+D
transition lines at u = 0, indicating that cooperators may
survive even if b is close to the maximal value.
Finally, it is of interest to explore the generality of our
observations by means of different evolutionary games.
Due to the famous claim that the spatial structure may
inhibit the evolution of cooperation in the snowdrift
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Figure 5: Top panel: Frequency of cooperators Fc in dependence on
the parameter r for different values of the selection parameter u. From
left to right u = 0.5, 0.4, 0.3, 0.2, 0.1 and 0, respectively. Bottom
panel: Critical threshold values of the parameter r = rc, marking the
transition to the pure D phase (extinction of cooperators), in depen-
dence on the selection parameter u for different neighborhood sizes.
It is to be emphasized that these results are qualitatively in agreement
with those obtained for the prisoner’s dilemma game (see Fig. 2). De-
picted results in both panels were obtained for K = 0.1.
game (Hauert and Doebeli, 2004), the snowdrift game
naturally becomes an appropriate candidate for this task.
Figure 5 depicts the fraction of cooperators Fc in depen-
dence on the parameter r for different values of u. Sim-
ilarly as in Fig 2, it can be observed that with the value
of u decreasing, the evolution of cooperation is facili-
tated, which is qualitatively consistent with the results
obtained for the prisoner’s dilemma game. Interestingly
though, the effect is less pronounced, which may be at-
tributed to the fact that the spatiality is indeed less cru-
cial (is in fact detrimental) for the evolution of cooper-
ation in the snowdrift game, than it is for the evolution
of cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma. This asser-
tion if fully confirmed upon examining the dependence
of the critical r = rc for different neighborhood sizes
k. We remind the reader that for the prisoner’s dilemma
game the fact that larger values of k decrease the level
of cooperation is expected since increasing the neigh-
borhood size will gradually lead to well-mixed condi-
tions. Since the spatial structure is known to be cru-
cial for the sustenance of cooperators in the prisoner’s
dilemma game (Nowak and May, 1992), this is an ex-
pected result that is not difficult to understand. It also
means that the spatiality (the fact that interactions are
limited to neighbors on the lattice) is crucial for the ob-
served promotion of cooperation. The results for the
snowdrift game presented in the bottom panel of Fig 5
are different. The paper by Hauert and Doebeli (2004)
identified key differences in the pattern formation of co-
operators by the snowdrift game that is due to the dif-
ferent payoff structure (if compared to the prisoner’s
dilemma game). While in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma
cooperators can survive by forming large, compact clus-
ters, in the spatial snowdrift game cooperators form only
small filament-like clusters. The latter make it advanta-
geous to adopt strategies that are opposite to neighbor-
ing strategies, ultimately resulting in the fact that the
spatial structure actually inhibits the evolution of coop-
eration in the snowdrift game. Our results in the bottom
panel of Fig 5 agree with this in that larger values of
k (larger neighborhoods), decreasing the impact of spa-
tiality, promote cooperation in the snowdrift game (note
that values of rc become higher for larger k). Thus, the
impact of k is opposite to that for the prisoner’s dilemma
game, which is in agreement with the argumentation
proposed by Hauert and Doebeli (2004). On the other
hand, the impact of the parameter u is the same in that
the smaller it is the larger the value of Fc. A special case
is the result for k = 4 by the snowdrift game, where the
parameter u seems to play an even more crucial role than
for higher values of k. A precise reason for this was im-
possible for us to find. Intuitively, for k = 4 the conflict
between the fact that spatial structure inhibits the evo-
lution of cooperation while small values of u promote
it is expressed most severely, thus leading to the strong
dependence, i.e., much stronger than for larger values of
k or for any value of k in the prisoner’s dilemma game.
Note that in the latter game the aforementioned conflict
does not emerge because there the spatial structure at
k = 4 is in fact optimal for the evolution of coopera-
tion, while for the snowdrift game it is the most pro-
hibitive. Nevertheless, these results support the fact that
the newly identified mechanism that boosts the effect of
spatial reciprocity is generally valid, and should thus be
observable also under circumstances that were not ex-
plicitly taken into account in this paper.
4. Discussion
The evolutionary success of cooperators in social
dilemmas is an important and vibrant topic. In order
7
to provide insights into this fascinating phenomenon,
the prisoner’s dilemma, as a basic and general metaphor
for the problem, is commonly employed. In its orig-
inal form, it is to be expected that rational individu-
als will favor defection of cooperation. This can be
averted by introducing spatially structured interactions
(Nowak and May, 1992). In the spatial setting, coop-
erators are able to survive by forming compact clus-
ters, which disables the defectors to exploit those that
are located in the interior of such clusters. However,
if the temptation to defect is sufficiently large, the spa-
tial reciprocity may fail to sustain cooperation. To over-
come this, various additional mechanisms that may pro-
mote cooperation have been proposed. Some of them
focused on individual properties of players, as for ex-
ample the teaching activity (Szolnoki and Szabo´, 2007),
while others focused on the external factors (or the envi-
ronment), as for example the structure of the interaction
network (Abramson and Kuperman, 2001). Motivated
by this fact, and by the concept of fitness as often de-
fined from the biological viewpoint, we introduce here
an alternative definition of fitness that is composed from
inheritance (the payoffs as obtained by playing the game
with the neighbors) and the environment (the average
payoff of all the neighbors). Depending on which pay-
off is higher, the influence of either option can be tuned
by means of a single parameter u. Our approach is of
course a minimalist one, allowing for proof of princi-
ple rather than accurate claims about specific setups, yet
it demonstrates effectively that the concept of fitness is
amenable to simple adjustments that may have wanted
consequences for the evolution of cooperation. In par-
ticular, by means of systematic simulations, we have
shown that considering the environment as a necessary
composition of fitness can greatly promote the evolution
of cooperation, especially if compared to the traditional
version of the game (either the prisoner’s dilemma or
the snowdrift game) that does not take into account the
role of the environment in individual development. But
also, we demonstrate that if the individuals are too avid
in coveting what their neighbors have (in terms of pay-
offs), the evolution of cooperation will not be optimally
promoted. The best is to adjust both influences to be
represented equally strong.
In addition, we have presented a detailed analysis of
the promotion effect with the help of time courses and
the outcome of the games by different levels of uncer-
tainty governing the strategy adoptions. Although de-
fection is prevalent in the early stages of the evolution-
ary process, small values of the parameter u can revert
this trend, typically so that the few remaining coopera-
tors form very compact clusters that are impervious to
defector attacks. These clusters, although initially small
and rare, may inflate fast and ultimately outperform the
defectors. Also interesting is the fact that the introduc-
tion of u seems to alter the effective interaction topol-
ogy of the square lattice. If the value of u is large, i.e.,
if the average payoff of the neighbors is considered as
too strong a factor in the determination of individual fit-
ness, there exists only the “worst level” of uncertainty,
at which cooperators go extinct by the smallest tempta-
tion to defect. Conversely, if u = 0, which constitutes
the optimal setup for the evolution of cooperation, there
exists an optimal level of uncertainty, which can only
be observed if the interaction topology is lacking over-
lapping triangles (Szabo´ et al., 2005). However, since
the actual topology always remains unchanged, we at-
tribute the effect on the evolution of cooperation to the
possible alteration of the effective interaction topology
by means of previously unrelated individuals due to the
consideration of environmental factors.
Lastly, to test whether our approach is effective
also in evolutionary games other than the prisoner’s
dilemma, we explore the evolution of cooperation in
the snowdrift game. We obtain qualitatively identical
results as by the prisoner’s dilemma game, with some
minor differences existing with regards to the impact of
different neighborhood sizes. Nevertheless, the conclu-
sion that cooperation thrives best only if the influence
of payoffs obtained in the traditional way is equal to
that of the average payoff of the neighborhood remains
valid, thus constituting a viable route to increased levels
of cooperation in structured populations.
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